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Sobering Up After the Seventh Inning: Alcohol and Crime Around the Ballpark 1
Jonathan Klick
John MacDonald
Abstract
Objectives: This study examines the impact of alcohol consumption in a Major League Baseball (MLB)
stadium on area level counts of crime. The modal practice at MLB stadiums is to stop selling alcoholic
beverages after the seventh inning. Baseball is not a timed game, so the duration between end of the
seventh inning (last call for alcohol) and the end of the game varies considerably, providing a unique
natural experiment that allows us to estimate the relationship between alcohol consumption and crime
near a stadium on game days to non-game days and to areas around sports bars that fans also frequent
but are not subject to alcohol restrictions after the seventh inning.
Methods: Crime data were obtained from Philadelphia for the period 2006-2015 and geocoded to the
area around the MLB stadium as well as popular sports bars. We rely on difference-in-differences
regression models to estimate the change in crime on home game days around the stadium as the game
time extends into extra innings to other areas of the city and around sports bars in Philadelphia relative
to days when the baseball team plays away from home.
Results: We found that when there are extra innings and more game-time after the seventh inning
alcohol sales stoppage crime declines significantly around the stadium. The effects are largely driven by
a reduction in assaults. The crime reduction benefit of the last call alcohol policy is undone when a
complex of sports bars opens in the stadium parking lot in 2012. The results suggest that alcohol
consumption during baseball games is a contributor to crime.
Conclusions: The findings provide further support for environmental theories of crime that note the
congregation of people in places with excessive alcohol consumption is a generator of violent crime in
cities. The consumption of alcohol in MLB stadiums appears to increase opportunities for people to get
swept up into fights.
Key Words: Crime generators; Stadium, Alcohol and crime; Crime and Place
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Introduction
A growing body of literature finds that alcohol consumption is a contributor to crime (Carpenter
& Dobkin, 2011). Excessive alcohol consumption, for example, influences cognition and suppresses
moral prohibitions that act as inhibitors of aggression (Exum, 2002). Alcohol consumption may also
place individuals who drink in excess at greater risk for victimization, as criminal offenders may see
inebriated people as easier targets for robbery and assault (Sherman, 1992). The consumption of alcohol
in group settings may also fuel crime by increasing the number of social contacts, making people more
talkative and increasing social interactions between motivated offenders and victims (Carpenter &
Dobkin, 2011). In general, evidence suggests that alcohol increases the risk of crime through offender,
victim, and group setting channels.
It is not surprising then that alcohol-reduction policies have long been part of public health
campaigns to reduce accidents, injuries, and violent crimes associated with its use (Fagan, 1990). The
primary public policy approaches to reducing alcohol consumption have been to raise prices by imposing
excise taxes on alcohol beverages, setting minimum age restrictions on the purchase and consumption
of alcohol, limiting the times (hours and days of week) when alcohol beverages can be sold, and
regulating the places where alcohol can be sold and consumed in public settings (Carpenter & Dobkin,
2011).
While carefully done studies of alcohol restrictions around places generally suggest that
reducing alcohol consumption lowers interpersonal crimes, these studies face standard identification
problems. The place and time restrictions, for example, are often set up in response to concerns with
crime and other negative externalities, or they may be implemented as part of a broader effort to curb
the connection between alcohol and crime. Restrictions to close bars and taverns at earlier times of the
day, or on given days of the week, are often a result of a concern with the crime and disorder facilitated
at given locations that are hot spots for crime (Sherman, 1992).
2
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In England and Wales, for example, in 2005 the government removed restrictions on the closing
time for bars to reduce crowding of intoxicated individuals on streets that were thought to be a primary
contributor to assaults (Humprheys & Eisner, 2010). More generally, regulations that seek to reduce
consumption of alcohol in specific places may be endogenously related to concerns with crime and
other negative externalities of excessive alcohol use. At the same time, there is an appreciable amount
of literature suggesting that alcohol consumption in group settings, like sporting events, may be crime
generators.
In this paper, we examine the impact of alcohol consumption during Major League Baseball
(MLB) games on crime around a sports stadium. We rely on a novel natural experiment to provide
credible estimates of the impact of alcohol consumption during MLB games on crime near a stadium.
The MLB practice of ceasing to sell beer and other alcoholic beverages in stadiums at the end of the
seventh inning provides an especially useful natural experiment to examine the impact of alcohol
consumption on crime, because baseball is not a timed game. The game duration from the end of the
seventh inning to the end of the game can be short or long. An inning could be as short as six pitches or
it could go on indefinitely. Further, since there are no ties in MLB games, games can be as short as eight
and a half innings or can go into effectively unlimited extra innings. This aspect of MLB games allows us
to examine a wide range of time spans during which spectators are limited in their ability to drink
alcohol. Thus, we can compare game days with non-game days when the game is at home or away, and
when the time from the end of the seventh inning extends and fans who are in attendance are more
likely to sober up.
We examine Philadelphia Phillies games because the Citizens Bank Park (CBP) stadium provides
an additional quasi-experiment for us to exploit. In March 2012, the Xfinity Live! 2 complex opened in the
stadium parking lot. This entertainment venue contains several bars and restaurants that sell alcohol

2
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until 2 a.m. each evening, effectively undoing any potential effect of the alcohol sale stoppage in the
stadium at the end of the seventh inning.
We find that games that are relatively lengthy after the seventh inning and games with extra
innings generate lower crime around CBP, as compared to other areas around the city. For the average
game, it appears that the alcohol sales restriction reduces assaults by around 50 percent. These effects
are concentrated within the first hour after the game, with little additional crime reduction occurring
after that, and in a relatively small area around CBP. We do not observe similar effects around a
selection of popular sports bars in other areas of the city where no seventh inning restriction on alcohol
sales applies. These effects largely vanish after the Xfinity Live! complex opened and allowed fans to
continue to drink alcohol after the seventh inning in the stadium parking lot, further suggesting the link
between the stadium alcohol restrictions and crime is causal.
In the following sections we briefly highlight prior literature on the effects of age, time, and
place-based alcohol restrictions and sporting events on crime. We then discuss how theories of
environmental criminology explain the mechanism through which alcohol consumption in places that
gather people for legitimate social contact generates crime. This section is followed by an explanation of
our unique methodology for identifying the effect of alcohol sales on crime during baseball games. Our
results and analyses follow. Finally, we discuss the implications of this research for theories on
criminality of places and crime prevention policy.
Age, Time, and Place Restrictions on Alcohol
Alcohol has long been thought to be a contributor to violent crime, with the most pronounced
effects being for assaults. However, the historical empirical evidence for the physiological effects of
intoxication as a direct cause of aggression has not be particularly convincing (see Fagan, 1990 for a
review). More recently, scholars have turned to examining the impact of different alcohol restriction
policies on crime. Studies have examined the effect of excise taxes imposed on alcohol sales, minimum
4
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age of alcohol access restrictions, and spatial/temporal restriction of alcohol availability. Multiple
studies show when excise taxes on alcohol are raised alcohol consumption and violent crime drops
(Cook & Moore, 2001; Cook & Moore, 1993; Matthews et al., 2006; Sivarajasingam et al., 2006). This
literature is, however, limited because states seldom change excise tax rates on alcohol, so most of
these effects are estimated from cross-sectional differences in taxes between states (see Cook &
Durrance, 2013 for an exception).
The empirical evidence of link between alcohol consumption and crime is the strongest from
studies that examine age restrictions. Studies have taken advantage of the fact that the minimum
alcohol drinking age of 21 in the United States is the only policy that discretely impacts people at this
age. Several carefully done studies find that alcohol consumption jumps sharply at age 21 (see
Carpenter & Dobkin, 2001 for a review). Carpenter and Dobkin (2015), for example, find that arrests in
California jump by a significant 6% for individuals after turning age 21. This increase in arrests is mostly
attributable to a rise in assaults, alcohol-related offenses, and nuisance crimes.
Studies on time and place restrictions also find that limiting alcohol sales to given times (days or
hours of operation) and places also reduces crime (Carpenter & Dobkin, 2011). Several studies have
capitalized on natural experiments and examined what happens when there is a change in the times
when alcohol can be sold, or the locations of alcohol establishments. Olsson and Wikstrom (1982) find
that a 3-month prohibition of Saturday sales of alcohol in state-run liquor stores in Sweden reduced
weekend public-order crimes, domestic disturbances, and assaults. Norstrom and Skog (2005), in a
follow-up study, find that the repeal of the Saturday alcohol-sales ban in Sweden had no impact on
assaults on Saturdays, despite a clear increase in alcohol sales. However, the number of assaults was so
low at the time that this study may have been underpowered to detect effects. More recently, Heaton
(2012) finds that the repeal of the Sunday alcohol-sales ban that was applied to only a set of jurisdictions
in Virginia in 2004 and 2008 led to significant increases in minor and serious alcohol-related crimes on
5
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Sundays. The increase in alcohol-related offenses on Sunday also occurred in the afternoon when stores
were open, suggesting that it is the consumption of alcohol shortly after stores open that generates the
additional crime. Han et al. (2016), however, show that the lifting of Sunday sales prohibitions on
alcohol in state-run stores in Pennsylvania has only a modest impact on crime in high poverty
neighborhoods in Philadelphia.
Although the density and location of alcohol outlets are a known correlate of violent crime
(Weisburd et al., 2012), most studies of alcohol outlets and violence are cross sectional. There are,
however, a growing number of studies that examine what happens to crime after the opening or closing
of alcohol outlets. Teh (2008), for example, finds that the opening of alcohol outlets in Los Angeles was
associated with an increase in crimes around stores located in high poverty neighborhoods. Anderson et
al. (2016) find that law changes in counties in Kansas that lifted prohibitions of selling alcohol to the
public for on-premise consumption was associated with an increase in violent crime. The increase in
violent crime also appears to be largest in counties that do not require a percentage of food to be sold
at a bar, suggesting that the consumption of alcohol in bars is the primary contributor to the increase in
violent crime. Evidence that opening bars is associated with an increase in violent crime is consistent
with the widely-shared belief in criminology that bars are a common feature of violent crime hot spots
in cities (Sherman et al., 1989; Weisburd et al., 2012; Ratcliffe, 2015; Tillyer, Wilcox, & Walter, 2020).
Large social events that involve alcohol consumption are also associated with increased risk of
crime. Research on crime around college football stadiums, for example, shows that arrests for assaults
and disorder offenses increase significantly on game days (Rees & Schepel, 2009; Merlo et al., 2010).
Several studies also find that crime increases in areas surrounding sports stadiums on home game days
(Billings & Depken, 2011; Kurland, 2014; Marie, 2016; Kurkland & Johnson, 2019), when a stadium is
present versus torn down (Vandeviver et al., 2019), and on days that sport stadiums are used

6
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(Campaniello, 2013; Munyo & Rossi, 2013). 3 Kurkland and Johnson (2019), for example, examine
changes in crime levels around five soccer stadiums in the United Kingdom. They find that crime is
higher on game days than other days of the week, and that the increase in crime is highest in
neighborhoods closer to the stadiums and those with bars or restaurants.
While the presence of bars near sports stadiums appears to be a crime generator, studies on the
criminality of places typically do not measure how crime varies with the availability of alcohol. The
closest study that alludes to the link between alcohol consumption and crime around sporting events is
Kurland and Johnson (2019), as they find that crime increases in neighborhoods with bars near soccer
stadiums. However, this study cannot separate out the influence of alcohol consumption from the
increase in the number of patrons who come to sports bars to watch the soccer games.
In general, studies that examine the impact of sports stadiums on crime cannot separate out
whether the sporting events impact interpersonal crimes like assaults because of gathering more people
together, or because of the excessive alcohol consumption. At college football games, for example,
alcohol sales are already generally banned in stadiums, so fans tend to drink alcohol just outside the
stadium prior to the game and subvert the impact of sales restrictions. There are, however,
criminological theories that explain why limiting alcohol sales in specific times and places may help
thwart crime in settings that bring groups of people together for social contact.
Environmental Criminology: Situational Opportunities Theories
Environmental criminology provides a clear framework for understanding how the place in
which alcohol is consumed can be a facilitator of crime (Wilcox & Gialopsos, 2015). Environmental
criminology assumes that crime patterns in space are distributed according to how the environment of a
place at a given time influences the volume and types of criminal opportunities. Theories that fall within

3
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the framework of environmental criminology articulate mechanisms by which alcohol consumption in
specific places may interact to generate crime.
Alcohol consumption affects cognition and vulnerability. Impaired individuals, for example, are
more likely to be aggressive or appear vulnerable to would-be offenders. Clarke’s (1995) situational
crime prevention theory argues that offending may be influenced by alcohol consumption, as excessive
alcohol consumption makes people myopic and may change their perceptions of the crime opportunity
structure. This may be particularly true in the context of alcohol-fueled offenses such as assaults, where
group dynamics of excessive drinking may lead to more potential opportunities for fights. Similarly,
there may be dynamics of places at a given time of day (e.g., when bars close) where an increase in the
number of inebriated people on the streets provides a target-rich environment for potential
confrontations. Weisburd et al. (1992), for instance, find that calls about public drinking are one of the
main correlates of robbery hot spots. Multiple studies find that excessive alcohol consumption prior to
closing time and crowding in the streets after bars close are risk factors for assaults (Graham & Homel,
2012).
Cohen and Felson’s (1979) routine activity theory also explains how the movement of people
between places influences the presence of motivate offenders, suitable targets, and guardianship to
thwart crime. Alcohol consumed in social settings, like sports stadiums and bars, may create larger flows
of inebriated people in the streets and provide more opportunities for robberies and assaults between
people. Recreational drinking of alcohol at places where people gather to watch sporting events may
also generate more public-order offenses and assaults by increasing the number of motivated offenders,
as inhibitions against violence and disorderly behavior are lowered when people are intoxicated.
Within the context of places themselves, crime pattern theory provides a clear typology for
explaining how the activity patterns around places that gather people together for legitimate uses, like
watching a sporting event in a bar or stadium, becomes a crime generator. As Brantingham and
8

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3567418

Brantingham (1995) explain, sports stadiums and other venues that bring large numbers of people
together for reasons “unrelated to any particular level of criminal motivation” can become crime
generators by creating sufficient concentrations of people in a setting that allows people to “exploit
criminal opportunities” (pp. 7-8). Intoxicated people in greater numbers near each other provide more
available opportunities for interpersonal crimes like assaults, as drunk individuals get “swept up into
fights” (p.11). Rowdy bars are particularly prone environments for assaults to occur (Graham et al.,
2006).
In summary, environmental criminology perspectives suggest alcohol consumption in group
settings may fuel crimes of interpersonal violence like assaults.
Last Call for Alcohol Sales
Although Major League Baseball (MLB) does not mandate rules regarding the sale of alcohol at
individual sports stadiums, most MLB teams adopt a host of sales restrictions. 4 The focus of this paper is
the rule about when alcohol sales cease during baseball games. All MLB stadiums stop selling alcohol
prior to the end of the game. The Philadelphia Phillies ballpark, Citizens Bank Park (CBP), ceases sales at
the end of the seventh inning. 5 This is the most common policy among MLB teams, though some stop
sales as late as the end of the eighth inning (e.g., Baltimore Orioles for concession stand sales) and
others as early as the middle of the seventh inning (e.g., New York Yankees for concession stand and
hawker sales). Other alcohol restrictions include limits on how many alcoholic drinks an individual can
purchase at a time (generally two, as is the case for the Phillies) and maximum cup sizes (24 oz. for the
Phillies).

Major League Baseball is a member of Team Coalition (along with the other major U.S. sports leagues) which
does provide a list of best practices regarding alcohol sales. See https://teamcoalition.org/training/policies/
5
See https://fansdontletfansdrivedrunk.org/team/mlb/philadelphia-phillies/#1442768220251-8edb53aabec4d832-ba39ff22-02f5
4
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The logistics of an MLB baseball game seventh inning sales cut off creates quasi-randomization
regarding how long people are prohibited from purchasing alcohol. Because baseball is not a timed
game, the duration from the end of the seventh inning to the end of the game (when spectators
generally leave the ballpark) is variable game-to-game.
Putting aside games affected by rain delays (which we exclude from our analysis) which can
cause a game to end during any inning, a baseball game can have as few as eight and a half innings
(when the home team is winning after the visiting team bats in the top of the 9th inning) or can extend to
effectively limitless innings since a baseball game cannot end in a tie. 6 Beyond that, an inning itself has
no fixed time duration, ending only after each team has recorded three outs. The minimum number of
pitches that could end an inning is six, although that has not happened. 7 On the other end of things, the
number of pitches thrown in an inning is limitless. For example, in the top of the second inning in a July
26, 1999 San Francisco Giants game, pitcher Russ Ortiz threw 63 pitches to retire the St. Louis Cardinals
and then Jose Jimenez threw 32 pitches to retire the Giants in the bottom of the inning. 8 In one
instance, a pitcher threw 21 pitches to get a single batter out. 9 Further, there is no restriction on how
long it takes a pitcher to throw a pitch. 10
This variability inherent in the game of baseball allows us to examine changes in crime when
spectators are prohibited from buying alcohol for a long period of time versus games where the
prohibition ends up being quite short. Focusing on the Phillies CBP stadium also allows us to exploit an

The longest game in MLB history was 25 innings and lasted eight hours and six minutes on May 8, 1984 between
Chicago White Sox and the Milwaukee Brewers.
7
There have been fewer than 200 total instances where an individual pitcher has thrown just three pitches in an
inning, but none of these instances occurred in the same inning by two opposing pitchers. See
https://www.baseball-almanac.com/feats/3_pitch_inning.shtml
8
https://www.baseball-reference.com/boxes/SFN/SFN199907260.shtml
9
San Francisco Giant Brandon Belt faced a total of 21 pitches from Los Angeles Angels pitcher Jaime Barria in the
1st inning of the April 22, 2018 match. See https://www.baseball-reference.com/boxes/ANA/ANA201804220.shtml
10
The advanced statistic PACE provides some measure of how fast pitchers work. In some years, based on the
PACE metric, the difference between the fastest and slowest working pitchers may be as much as 20 seconds per
throw.
6
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additional source of variation. In March of 2012, the Xfinity Live! entertainment complex was opened on
the corner of Pattison Avenue and 11th Street directly opposite the Southwest corner of CBP, about 300
feet from the ballpark gates in what was previously part of the stadium parking lot.
Xfinity Live! includes, among other bars and restaurants, the Broad Street Bullies Pub and the
Victory Beer Hall. These establishments serve alcohol nightly until 2 a.m. Because these places
effectively undo the CBP seventh inning cut-off, as spectators can either leave a game early and walk
0.05 miles to continue drinking or, if they stay in the ballpark for the final out, fans can easily resume
drinking in what is basically the ballpark’s parking lot. Given this, if alcohol consumption in stadiums
increases crime, we should see any effect of the ballpark alcohol cut off on crime diminish substantially
after Xfinity Live! opens in the 2012 baseball season.
Design and Empirical Methods
In this study, we leverage the difference in crime around the Citizens Ball Park (CBP) in Philadelphia
between 2006 and 2015 to examine the effect of alcohol consumption during baseball games on
surrounding crime rates. To estimate the impact of alcohol consumption we employ a differences-indifferences design, which compares changes in crime around CBP on home game days when they extend
into extra innings to away game days and to other areas of Philadelphia not located near CBP. We
estimate changes in total reported crime, assaults, theft, liquor violations, and disorderly conduct. We
focus on these subcategories of total crime as they are most likely to be influenced by excessive alcohol
consumption in stadiums. We construct the counts of crimes at different geographic units of analysis
(Police Service Area, roadway network, and Census Block) for each day of observation. Our primary
specification estimates the count of crime on a given game day within a specific geographic unit around
the CPB according to the following form:
𝑌𝑌it = 𝛽𝛽0 + 𝛽𝛽1 𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻 𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝑡𝑡 ∗ 𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸 𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑡𝑡 ∗ 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽2 𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻 𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝑡𝑡 ∗ 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖 +
𝛽𝛽3 𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸 𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑡𝑡 ∗ 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖 + 𝛼𝛼𝑡𝑡 + 𝛿𝛿𝑖𝑖 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 (1)
11
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For model (1) we analyze the relationship between the home game day and presence of extra innings at
different levels of geography (geographic units denoted by i) around CBP for a given day (denoted by t)
on the count of crime (Yit). The interaction term (𝛽𝛽1 ) provides the treatment effect estimate of the extra

innings during home game days on crime surrounding CBP stadium. The regression model also accounts

for potentially higher crime in the CBP area on home game days (𝛽𝛽2 ) generally (i.e., whether there are

extra innings or not), and it accounts for potentially higher crime around CBP during extra-innings games
(𝛽𝛽3 ) even when the game is away. This latter effect is necessary since we define the span of a day as

running from the time of the first pitch to the time of the last out plus one hour. Because of this, extra
inning game days will mechanically generate more crime simply because the window of time is longer.
The model also includes separate fixed effect dummies for every day in the sample to control for period
effects, and separate fixed effects for each geographic unit to allow for differential crime baselines by
area.
We use only days during the baseball regular season (April – October) and drop days entirely if
the Philadelphia Phillies played a double header (24 days) or a game that had any rain delay time (54
games). Standard errors are clustered at the location level to account for dependence within areas.
Data
We use incident report based crime data provided by the Philadelphia Police Department. 11 These data
cover each crime reported in the city and include both location data (latitude and longitude as well as
street block) and the date and time the crime is reported. The data are available starting in 2006 and are
updated regularly. Our analyses cover the 2006 through the 2015 baseball season. We aggregate total
crime counts and subcategories (assault, theft, liquor violations, disorderly conduct) to the Philadelphia

11

https://www.opendataphilly.org/dataset/crime-incidents
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Police Department’s Police Service Areas (PSA) as our primary geographic unit of analysis. 12 We include
the entire PSA in which the CBP stadium is located (District 3; PSA 3) 13 as our primary treatment area. In
separate analyses, we also aggregate crime counts on game days to the Census Block level 14 to focus
more tightly on the area just around the stadium. The Census designation effectively covers the stadium
and its nearby parking lots, but this means the eastern boundary is coincident with the wall of the
stadium and, therefore, does not capture any crimes committed to the east of the stadium. Although
the Census blocks are a sensible unit for measuring crime around CBP, in addition to this eastern
boundary problem, it also includes the Philadelphia Eagles practice facility which is inaccessible to the
public (West of Broad Street).
To provide an additional geographic measure of crime, we also aggregate crime to the natural
transportation nodes around CBP as another treatment unit. Three of these boundaries are major
highways or arterial roads (I-95 is 1900 feet to the South of the CBP southern wall, I-76 is 1500 feet to
the North of the CBP northern wall, and Broad Street is 1500 feet to the West of the CBP western wall).
The approach of counting crime around a node network is consistent with studies that use road
networks to examine the spatial patterns of crime (Davis & Johnson, 2015). Only the eastern boundary
has no comparable transportation border. For the eastern boundary, we measured 1500 feet from the
eastern CBP wall. Any crime that occurred within the CBP PSA but outside of this boundary was assigned
to a separate geographic unit. We perform analyses on this natural CBP geographic unit as compared to
all other PSAs in the city.

There are 66 PSAs in Philadelphia. PSAs are police patrol boundaries within police districts that were designed to
be reflective of neighborhood boundaries as part of the Philadelphia Police Department’s shift to community
police.
13
https://www.phillypolice.com/districts/3rd/index.html
14
Citizens Bank Park is located in Census Tract Code 9806.00; see
https://www2.census.gov/geo/maps/dc10map/tract/st42_pa/c42101_philadelphia/DC10CT_C42101_003.pdf.
12
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To provide an additional comparison, we also measured boundaries of comparable dimensions
around popular sports bars in Philadelphia. These bars draw Phillies fans on game nights but do not stop
selling alcoholic beverages at the end of the seventh inning. This comparison allows us to examine
whether game-specific dynamics (e.g., especially exciting games) affect crime among drinking sports
fans independent of the alcohol service policy in ways that might be coincidentally related to game
duration. Admittedly, any choice of what sports bars to compare with CBP will be arbitrary. While the
choice of sports bars is ad hoc, any game-induced drinking and crime effect should be exhibited around
the most sports bars.
To aggregate across time, we defined the relevant time period for each day’s crime as being the
time of the game’s first pitch through one hour after the end of the game. 15 For days where no game
was played, we define the time window as 7 p.m. to 11 p.m. which approximates the standard window
for game days. In subsequent analyses, we expanded this window to three hours after the end of the
game and five hours after the end of the game. For away games, which we use as comparators in some
analyses, we used the same timing approach but shift the time if the game was played outside of the
Eastern Time Zone. We drop days in which double headers are played and those that were delayed
because of rain. 16 We only examine days during baseball’s regular season, omitting pre-season games
and playoff games.
The available data on baseball games does not provide a specific time when innings begin (other
than the 1st) or end (other than the last). There is no way from public data to measure how much of a
game’s duration occurs after the seventh inning. To address this limitation, we measure game length

The generally available baseball game data have a specific time of first pitch and a total time of game from the
first pitch to the final out, but do not include a time of the last out. To determine the time of the last out, we
added the game time to the first pitch time.
16
The generally available baseball statistics do not note which games have rain delays. We purchased information
on rain delay time from Stats Perform (formerly Stats LLC), a data provider for MLB. From 2006-2015, the Phillies
played 54 games where there was non-zero rain delay time.
15
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using two proxies. First, we examine whether the game goes into extra innings because the score was
tied at the end of the 9th inning. Extra-inning games are substantially longer, clocking in at an average of
226 minutes compared to 172 minutes for games without extra innings. The difference in almost one
hour, allowing an average person the ability to process about one more alcoholic drink, 17 suggesting that
some share of spectators could sober up and reduce the effects of alcohol consumption crime. Second,
we include a measure of the number of pitches thrown after the seventh inning as a proxy for the length
of the game after alcohol sales cease. The number of pitches thrown in an inning is a good proxy for
duration, as the correlation coefficient between the duration of a game and total pitches thrown
exceeds 0.90, and complete pitch counts by inning are publicly recorded.
Descriptive Statistics
Table 1 provides descriptive statistics for crime counts per day the CBP PSA and all other PSAs for both
the baseball season period and year-round. While crime is generally only a little higher during baseball
season throughout the city, the increase is much larger in the CBP PSA.
Table 1: Daily Crime Descriptive Statistics (All Philadelphia PSAs v. Citizens Bank Park PSA)
Time Period Equals Game Start Time Through Game End Time Plus One Hour for Game Days
Time Period Equals 7 p.m. through 11 p.m. for Non-Game Days
(Standard Deviations in Parentheses)
All PSAs
CBP PSA
All PSAs
CBP PSA
Year Round
Baseball Season
Total Crime
1.78
2.79
1.88
3.15
(1.97)
(2.32)
(2.08)
(2.44)
Assault
0.29
0.49
0.32
0.56
(0.60)
(0.77)
(0.63)
(0.84)
Theft
0.18
0.26
0.19
0.30
(0.45)
(0.51)
(0.47)
(0.55)
Liquor Violations
0.01
0.13
0.01
0.20
(0.21)
(0.68)
(0.25)
(0.83)
Disorderly Conduct
0.04
0.10
0.04
0.13
(0.25)
(0.36)
(0.25)
(0.41)
See, for example, https://www.nhs.uk/common-health-questions/lifestyle/how-long-does-alcohol-stay-in-yourblood/
17
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Note: Data provided by Philadelphia Police Department and available publicly at
https://www.opendataphilly.org/dataset/crime-incidents. Data cover 2006-2015. Baseball Season
covers April through October. Only regular season games are included in game data. Game days that
include a double header or games with rain delay time are excluded from the data (X out of Y total
games). For games played in the Eastern time zone, the time period covered is the time of the first
pitch to the end of the game plus one hour. For games played in different time zones, the time period
covered is the time of the first pitch converted to Eastern time through the end of the game plus one
hour. For non-game days, the time period covers 7:00 p.m. to 11 p.m.
A comparison of crime in the CBP PSA during home and away games might be informative, since
the cut-off policy is only relevant for home games. That said, since the time window for aggregating
crimes is dependent on the length of the game (and if baseline crime rates differ according to the time
of day), it is important that the length of a game and start times be comparable. Table 2 provides
descriptive statistics about Phillies games during our sample period broken down by home and away
games. For most measures, home and away games are comparable in length, number of pitches after
the seventh inning, and start time.
Table 2: Descriptive Statistics for Phillies Games (Home v. Away)
(Standard Deviations in Parentheses)
Home
Away
Phillies’ Record
0.545
0.503
(0.498)
(0.500)
Total Pitches – mean
293
294
(45)
(41)
Pitches After 7th Inning – mean
68
68
(37)
(32)
Duration in Minutes – mean
178
178
(30)
(28)
Attendance – mean
38,440
31,735
(8,293)
(9,793)
Start Time – mode
7:07 p.m.
7:09 p.m.
Games – total
741
778
Extra Inning Games – total
75
81
Note: Data compiled from https://www.baseball-reference.com/teams/PHI/ game logs. Data cover
2006-2015. Only regular season games are included in game data. Game days that include a double
header or games with rain delay time are excluded from the data.
Table 3 shows crimes per day for home and away games. While there is not much difference
throughout Philadelphia in comparing crime during home games and during away games, the crime
16
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appears to be 46% higher in the CBP PSA during home game days (3.87) than during days when the
game is away (2.65). This pattern of elevated crime counts around CPB on home game days is also
apparent for assaults, theft, liquor violations, and disorderly conduct.
Table 3: Gameday Daily Crime Descriptive Statistics (Home Game Days v. Away Game Days)
Time Period Equals Game Start Time Through Game End Time Plus One Hour
(Standard Deviations in Parentheses)
All PSAs
CBP PSA
All PSAs
CBP PSA
Home Game Days
Away Game Days
Total Crime
1.92
3.87
1.85
2.65
(2.16)
(2.70)
(2.07)
(2.22)
Assault
0.32
0.63
0.31
0.48
(0.63)
(0.89)
(0.62)
(0.78)
Theft
0.19
0.33
0.20
0.28
(0.47)
(0.59)
(0.47)
(0.54)
Liquor Violations
0.02
0.54
0.01
0.01
(0.35)
(1.31)
(0.20)
(0.12)
Disorderly Conduct
0.04
0.24
0.04
0.07
(0.26)
(0.54)
(0.24)
(0.30)
Note: Data provided by Philadelphia Police Department and available publicly at
https://www.opendataphilly.org/dataset/crime-incidents. Data cover 2006-2015. Baseball Season
covers April through October. Only regular season games are included in game data. Game days that
include a double header or games with rain delay time are excluded from the data. For games played
in the Eastern time zone, the time period covered is the time of the first pitch to the end of the game
plus one hour. For games played in different time zones, the time period covered is the time of the
first pitch converted to Eastern time through the end of the game plus one hour.
Table 4 provides descriptive statistics for crime in the CBP PSA comparing 9 inning games to
extra innings, and home and away games. The home and away comparison is important because the
extra-inning games will include a longer time window in total, which could mechanically increase the
crime counts. The difference in counts between extra-inning games and 9 inning games for away games
provides some calibration for this expanding window effect.
Table 4: Gameday Daily Crime Descriptive Statistics – CBP PSA (9 Inning Games v. Extra Inning Games)
Time Period Equals Game Start Time Through Game End Time Plus One Hour
(Standard Deviations in Parentheses)
9 Innings
Extra Innings
9 Innings
Extra Innings
Home Game Days
Away Game Days
Total Crime
3.81
4.40
2.57
3.33
17
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(2.60)
(3.42)
(2.21)
(2.26)
Assault
0.62
0.72
0.45
0.77
(0.89)
(0.83)
(0.73)
(1.09)
Theft
0.33
0.32
0.27
0.30
(0.59)
(0.62)
(0.54)
(0.53)
Liquor Violations
0.54
0.55
0.01
0.02
(1.27)
(1.69)
(0.11)
(0.16)
Disorderly Conduct
0.23
0.33
0.07
0.05
(0.53)
(0.60)
(0.30)
(0.22)
Note: Data provided by Philadelphia Police Department and available publicly at
https://www.opendataphilly.org/dataset/crime-incidents. Data cover 2006-2015. Baseball Season
covers April through October. Only regular season games are included in game data. Game days that
include a double header or games with rain delay time are excluded from the data. For games played
in the Eastern time zone, the time period covered is the time of the first pitch to the end of the game
plus one hour. For games played in different time zones, the time period covered is the time of the
first pitch converted to Eastern time through the end of the game plus one hour. Data only cover the
PSA that includes Citizens Bank Park.
While crime in the CBP PSA is higher at home for extra-inning games than it is for 9 inning
games, the proportional increase of 15% is about half as large (4.4/3.81=1.15) as the same comparison
for away game days (3.33/2.57=1.30). Looking at specific crimes, it appears as though assaults are the
most affected crime category. Assaults rise by only 16% on home game days with extra innings
compared to 71% for away games with extra innings. This is consistent with much of the literature
previously reviewed that suggests assaults are particularly sensitive to alcohol consumption and the
policies used to influence that consumption. These increases in assault, however, is only an illustration
and does not provide any strong identification.
Results
Table 5 provides results from our regression specifications of total crime, assaults, thefts, liquor
violations and disorderly conduct at the PSA level and how they vary with different specifications. The
results show a general decline in crime around the CPB stadium on days when home games go into extra
innings, but we cannot reject the null hypothesis of no difference at a p<0.05. Relative to the average
number of assaults in the CBP PSA on days when the home game does not go into extra innings, this
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represents a decline of about one quarter. Thefts and liquor violations also decline by a statistically
significant amount of around p=.10 and p.=.02 respectively. Disorderly conduct violations, however,
increase significantly.
Recent work 18 suggests reasons to be concerned with standard inference approaches when
there are few treatment areas in difference-in-differences estimators, likely resulting in an underrejection of the null hypothesis. With this in mind, we present two-sided 10% critical values 19 that arise
from running the regressions repeatedly (65 times; one for each PSA) and using each non-CBP PSA as a
placebo treatment geographic unit. This approach is often referred to as randomization inference
(MacKinnon & Webb, 2018) or permutation tests for generating a reference distribution, and date back
to Fisher’s idea of exact inference (Ernst, 2004). 20
Table 5: Effect of Extra Innings on Crime
(Standard Errors Clustered at PSA Level)
{Two-Sided 10% Critical Values from Placebo Regressions}
Dependent Variable [Mean for CBP PSA Below]
Assaults
Theft
Liquor
Disorder
[0.56]
[0.30]
[0.20]
[0.13]
Extra Inning * Home Game * CBP PSA Coefficients
By Specifications/Sample Restrictions
-0.06
-0.17***
-0.03***
-0.01**
0.13***
(0.05)
(0.01)
(0.01)
(0.00)
(0.01)
{-0.61, 0.66}
{-0.17, 0.17}
{-0.18, 0.14}
{-0.03, 0.06}
{-0.09, 0.09}
-0.15***
-0.22***
-0.04***
-0.01***
0.14***
(0.05)
(0.01)
(0.01)
(0.00)
(0.01)
{-0.57, 0.66}
{-0.17, 0.17}
{-0.17, 0.14}
{-0.04, 0.05}
{-0.09, 0.09}
-0.39***
-0.21***
-0.07***
-0.13***
0.06***
(0.06)
(0.02)
(0.01)
(0.01)
(0.01)
{-0.84, 0.57}
{-0.22, 0.19}
{-0.20, 0.12}
{-0.03, 0.09}
{-0.10, 0.09}
-0.39***
-0.28***
-0.03***
-0.13***
0.10***
(0.05)
(0.02)
(0.01)
(0.01)
(0.01)
Total Crime
[3.15]

All Days Included;
No Length of Game
Controls
Only Game Days
Included; No Length
of Game Controls
All Days Included;
Length of Game
Controls Included
Only Game Days
Included; Length of

See, for example, Conley and Taber (2011); Cameron, Gelbach, and Miller (2008); and MacKinnon and Webb
(2019).
19
We present the placebo coefficients, though the inferences are generally unchanged if we use the t statistics
preferred by MacKinnon and Webb (2019).
20
Randomization inference or permutation tests are increasingly being used in criminology applications like this
one (see Kurland et al., 2014; Ridgeway & MacDonald, 2017).
18
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Game Controls
{-0.60, 0.63}
{-0.21, 0.24}
{-0.17, 0.13}
{-0.10, 0.13}
{-0.08, 0.10}
Included
Note: Each cell represents the coefficient on the treatment interaction (Extra Inning * Home Game *
CBP PSA) from a separate regression. In addition to this treatment interaction, each regression
includes the Extra Inning * CBP PSA and Home Game * CBP PSA interactions, as well as fixed effects
for each PSA and for each separate calendar day. In the regressions where length of game controls
are included, the following interactions are included in each regression: Game Length * Home Game *
CBP PSA and Game Length * CBP PSA.
Data cover 2006-2015. Only regular season games are included in game data. Game days that
include a double header or games with rain delay time are excluded from the data. For games played
in the Eastern time zone, the time period covered is the time of the first pitch to the end of the game
plus one hour. For games played in different time zones, the time period covered is the time of the
first pitch converted to Eastern time through the end of the game plus one hour. For non-game days,
the time period covers 7:00 p.m. to 11 p.m. Standard errors clustered at PSA level.
*** p < 0.01 (against two-tailed test of zero effect)
** p < 0.05 (against two-tailed test of zero effect)
* p < 0.10 (against two-tailed test of zero effect)
Table 5 also shows results that when the regressions are restricted to only game days. For this
specification the comparison now places the 9th inning vs extra inning differential for a home game
against the same differential for away games. Using this comparison, the coefficients barely change. In
this comparison, the effect on total crime is statistically significant and represents about a 5% reduction
in total crime.
Finally, table 5 shows results when the length of the game is controlled for. Longer games
generate larger time windows which could mechanically measure more crime. While our comparisons
with windows of the same duration in other areas of Philadelphia accounts for this, there may be
heterogeneity in the time profile of crimes such that the CBP area sees more of its crime earlier in the
day than do other areas. Accounting for the total duration of the game leads to larger decreases in the
total crime effect, the effect on assaults, and the effect on liquor violations. This is true whether we
include non-game days or not. However, as can be seen by the placebo critical values, standard
inference approaches likely lead to over-rejection of the null effect. Using an empirical placebo
distribution for inference, only the effects estimated for assaults are particularly large in magnitude.
20
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Focusing on extra innings, in some sense, leaves variation unexploited. As seen in Figure 1, while
extra inning games are generally longer than 9 inning games, there is substantial overlap in the
distributions of game duration.

Figure 1: Game Length (in minutes)
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While it is not possible, using public data, to parse out how much game time occurs after the
seventh inning, it is possible to know how many pitches were thrown by inning. Because there is a high
correlation between pitches thrown and the game’s duration (ρ > 0.92), we can use pitches as a time
proxy, which we do in Table 6. 21 For these regressions, the treatment effect is the interaction of Pitches
Thrown After the 7th Inning * Home Game * CBP PSA. These regressions also include the interactions
Pitches Thrown After the 7th Inning * CBP PSA and Home Game * CBP PSA, as well as the PSA and day
specific fixed effects. To account for overall length, we also include Total Pitches Thrown * Home Game
* CBP PSA and Total Pitches Thrown * CBP PSA. Given the earlier results, we focus only on assaults. The

We only focus on game days since non game days cannot provide us with a pitches thrown number or a reliable
proxy.
21
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importance of assaults in the existing literature likewise suggests assaults are a sensible place to focus
our attention.
Table 6: Effect of Pitches After 7th Inning on Assaults
(Standard Errors Clustered at PSA Level)
{Two-Sided 10% Critical Values from Placebo Regressions}
Game Days Only
-0.004***
(0.000)
{-0.003, 0.002}
-0.25

Pitches After 7th Inning * Home
Game * CBP PSA

Implied Reduction in Assaults
for Average Game
Implied Percentage Reduction
45%
Note: Each cell represents the coefficient on the treatment interaction (Pitches After 7th Inning *
Home Game * CBP PSA) from a separate regression. In addition to this treatment interaction, each
regression includes the Pitches After 7th Inning * CBP PSA and Home Game * CBP PSA interactions.
Each regression also includes the interactions Total Pitches * Home Game * CBP PSA and Total Pitches
* CBP PSA, as well as fixed effects for each PSA and for each separate calendar day
Data cover 2006-2015. Only regular season games are included in game data. Game days that
include a double header or games with rain delay time are excluded from the data. For games played
in the Eastern time zone, the time period covered is the time of the first pitch to the end of the game
plus one hour. For games played in different time zones, the time period covered is the time of the
first pitch converted to Eastern time through the end of the game plus one hour. For non-game days,
the time period covers 7:00 p.m. to 11 p.m. Standard errors clustered at PSA level.
*** p < 0.01 (against two-tailed test of zero effect)
** p < 0.05 (against two-tailed test of zero effect)
* p < 0.10 (against two-tailed test of zero effect)
We estimate that each pitch thrown after the 7th inning reduces assaults by almost 0.004. Given
that, on average, there are 68 pitches thrown after the alcohol policy goes into effect, this implies a
reduction in assaults of about 0.25, which is a proportionate reduction of almost one half. This effect is
statistically significant using the standard approach to inference. Comparison to the distribution of
placebo effects likewise suggests this effect was unlikely to have arisen by chance alone.
Philadelphia provides us with another source of variation. As discussed above, once Xfinity Live!
Opens in March 2012, any benefits of the stadium’s alcohol cut-off are likely to be undone as spectators
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now can now buy alcohol a few steps from the stadium no matter what inning it is. Table 7 shows results
focusing on assaults, allowing for differential effects before and after the 2012 baseball season. We
implement this in two different ways. First, we interact each of the previous effects with a dummy
variable for whether Xfinity Live! was open or not. Secondly, we provide results where we split the
sample into the pre-2012 period and the 2012 onward period. Both approaches yield the same
implication. The effects we previously observed largely disappear once Xfinity Live! opens.
Table 7: Assault Effect Before and After Xfinity Live Opens
(Standard Errors Clustered at PSA Level)
{Two-Sided 10% Critical Values from Placebo Regressions}
Full Sample
Full Sample
Before 2012
Late Pitches *
Home * CBP

-0.004***
(0.000)
{-0.003, 0.002}

-0.007***
(0.000)
{-0.003, 0.003}
0.009***
(0.000)
{-0.005, 0.005}
Yes

After 2012

-0.006***
(0.000)
{-0.003, 0.003}

Late Pitches *
0.001***
Home * CBP *
(0.000)
Xfinity Live Open
{-0.005, 0.004}
All Covariates
No
No
No
Above Interacted
with Indicator for
Xfinity Live Open
PSA Fixed Effects
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Day Specific Fixed
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Effects
Non Game Days
No
No
No
No
Included
Note: Data cover 2006-2015. Only regular season games are included in game data. Game days that
include a double header or games with rain delay time are excluded from the data. For games played
in the Eastern time zone, the time period covered is the time of the first pitch to the end of the game
plus one hour. For games played in different time zones, the time period covered is the time of the
first pitch converted to Eastern time through the end of the game plus one hour. Xfinity Live opened
in the South Philadelphia Sports Complex (which includes Citizens Bank Park) parking lot in March
2012. Standard errors clustered at PSA level.
*** p < 0.01 (against two-tailed test of zero effect)
** p < 0.05 (against two-tailed test of zero effect)
* p < 0.10 (against two-tailed test of zero effect)
In the regression with the interaction, the pre-2012 effect of pitches after the 7th inning is completely
offset by the 2012 onward effect of pitches after the 7th inning. In the split sample regressions, we
23
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observe our treatment effect in the pre-2012 sample, but we do not observe it in the sample covering
2012-2015. If anything, longer games are associated with an increase in assaults once Xfinity Live!
opens.
Effect Heterogeneity
Table 8 provides estimates when the sample is split by weekend games (Friday-Saturday),
weekday games (Sunday-Thursday), night games, when the Phillies win or lose, when a geographically
close opponent is played, by attendance levels, 22 and whether the game is tight. 23 All estimates are
presented for the full sample and before the opening of Xfinity Live.
Table 8: Heterogeneity in Assault Effect
(Standard Errors Clustered at PSA Level)
{Two-Sided 10% Critical Values from Placebo Regressions}
Full Sample
Before Xfinity Live!
Full Sample
-0.004***
-0.006***
(0.000)
(0.000)
{-0.003, 0.002}
{-0.003, 0.003}
Friday & Saturday Games Only
-0.006***
-0.009***
(0.000)
(0.001)
{-0.005, 0.004}
{-0.007, 0.007}
Sunday-Thursday Games Only
-0.003***
-0.006***
(0.000)
(0.000)
{-0.003, 0.003}
{-0.005, 0.004}
Night Games Only
-0.005***
-0.010***
(0.000)
(0.000)
{-0.004, 0.003}
{-0.004, 0.004}
Day Games Only
-0.002***
-0.001
(0.000)
(0.000)
{-0.004, 0.005}
{-0.006, 0.007}
Friday & Saturday Night Games Only
-0.007***
-0.010***
(0.000)
(0.001)
{-0.005, 0.007}
{-0.007, 0.007}
Phillies Win
-0.003***
-0.007***
(0.000)
(0.000)
{-0.003, 0.005}
{-0.004, 0.005}
Phillies Lose
-0.004***
-0.003***
The 75th percentile attendance level in CBP is 45,135.
We define a tight game as one that ends with a score differential of three runs or fewer. This tracks MLB’s
definition of a “close” game for the purposes of defining a save opportunity.
22
23
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(0.000)
(0.000)
{-0.004, 0.003}
{-0.006, 0.006}
Geographically Close Opponent
-0.006***
-0.013***
(0.000)
(0.000)
{-0.005, 0.007}
{-0.005, 0.007}
Attendance Below 75th Percentile
-0.002***
-0.005***
(0.000)
(0.000)
{-0.003, 0.003}
{-0.004, 0.006}
Attendance Above 75th Percentile
-0.006***
-0.007***
(0.001)
(0.001)
{-0.006, 0.006}
{-0.008, 0.007}
Tight Game
-0.005***
-0.009***
(0.000)
(0.000)
{-0.003, 0.003}
{-0.004, 0.004}
Note: Each cell provides the coefficient on the “Late Pitches * Home * CBP PSA” term and each
regression includes controls for “Late Pitches * CBP PSA,” “Home * CBP PSA,” “Total Pitches * Home *
CBP PSA,” and “Total Pitches * CBP PSA” terms, as well as date specific fixed effects and PSA specific
fixed effects. Data cover 2006-2015. Only regular season games are included in game data. Game
days that include a double header or games with rain delay time are excluded from the data. Non
game days are excluded. For games played in the Eastern time zone, the time period covered is the
time of the first pitch to the end of the game plus one hour. For games played in different time zones,
the time period covered is the time of the first pitch converted to Eastern time through the end of the
game plus one hour. Xfinity Live opened in the South Philadelphia Sports Complex (which includes
Citizens Bank Park) parking lot in March 2012. Geographically close opponents are the New York
Mets, the New York Yankees, the Baltimore Orioles, and the Washington Nationals. The time window
for each day includes the full span of the game plus 1 hour. Standard errors clustered at PSA level.
*** p < 0.01 (against two-tailed test of zero effect)
** p < 0.05 (against two-tailed test of zero effect)
* p < 0.10 (against two-tailed test of zero effect)
Perhaps unsurprisingly, we see larger effects for nighttime and weekend games when,
presumably, people are more inclined to drink excessively. There is some evidence that the effect is
larger when the Phillies win and when they play a geographically close opponent, though we do not
have much intuition for these results.
The differential attendance effects make sense as, presumably, more crowded games generate
more social interaction. The fact that our result is larger in tight games is also helpful for building
confidence that our result is driven by the alcohol sales restriction. One concern might be that as games
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last longer, people leave the CBP area before the end of the game, mechanically lowering assaults.
Presumably the potential for this is less when a game is more competitive.

Time Range of Effect
In the foregoing analyses, the time range studied on each game day runs from the time of the
first pitch to the time of the last out plus 1 hour. Such analyses presume that any effect of the stadium
alcohol policy will be temporally compact. To examine whether our estimated effect extends further in
time, we re-run the basic regression allowing also for time windows that add 3 hours and 5 hours to the
end of the game. The estimates of the basic treatment effects for each of these windows are presented
in Figure 2 below.

Assault Effects By Different Time Windows
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Figure 2:

+1 Hour
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95% Confidence Interval

Coefficient

The confidence intervals for the coefficients using each of the three-time windows are overlapping, suggesting that the effect of the stadium alcohol policy on assaults is concentrated during the
game time plus 1-hour period.
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Geographic Range of Effect
Until this point, we performed our analyses at the pre-defined Philadelphia Police PSA level.
While this approach has the benefit of using pre-determined geographic units of analysis, the PSA is, in a
sense, over-inclusive, since it includes city blocks that are quite far from CBP. We constructed a CBP
treatment area that better approximated the natural boundaries of the stadium. We aggregate crime in
the area around the ballpark between I-76 in the North, I-95 in the South, Broad Street to the West, and
a 1500 feet distance to the East. We then allocate all of the residual crime in CBP’s PSA to its own
geographic unit and keep all of the other PSAs constant. This re-organizing of the data allows us to
construct a tighter boundary around the ballpark, perhaps shoring up confidence that any observed
effect is driven by the drinking policy.
Table 9 shows results of regressions using this bespoke CBP boundary. The implied relative
reduction in assault rates is larger than the one observed when the entire PSA is taken as the treatment
area, suggesting that the assault generating effects of alcohol consumption in the stadium are highly
localized. 24
Table 9: Assault Effect in Tighter Area Around Citizens Bank Park
(Standard Errors Clustered at PSA Level)
Full Sample
Before Xfinity Live
Late Pitches * Home * CBP
-0.0009***
-0.0012***
Natural Boundary
(0.0002)
(0.0003)
Implied Reduction in Assaults
-0.06
-0.08
for Average Game
Average Assault in CBP Natural
0.1060
0.1246
Boundary
(0.4139)
(0.4346)
Percentage Effect for Average
-58%
-64%
th
Number of Pitches After 7
Inning
Note: Each regression includes controls for “Late Pitches * CBP,” “Home * CBP,” “Total Pitches *
Home * CBP,” and “Total Pitches * CBP” terms, as well as date specific fixed effects and area specific
Given that the bespoke CBP area is substantially smaller than other PSAs (and has much less crime than virtually
all of the PSAs due to its small area), we do not think the placebo inference approach is sensible with this analysis.
24
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fixed effects. Data cover 2006-2015. Only regular season games are included in game data. Game
days that include a double header or games with rain delay time are excluded from the data. Non
game days are excluded. For games played in the Eastern time zone, the time period covered is the
time of the first pitch to the end of the game plus one hour. For games played in different time zones,
the time period covered is the time of the first pitch converted to Eastern time through the end of the
game plus one hour. Xfinity Live opened in the South Philadelphia Sports Complex (which includes
Citizens Bank Park) parking lot in March 2012. The area around Citizens Bank Park goes West to
Broad Street, South to I-95, North to I-76, and East for 1 mile. All Comparison PSAs are used,
including the residual of the PSA that includes Citizens Bank Park.
*** p < 0.01 (against two-tailed test of zero effect)
** p < 0.05 (against two-tailed test of zero effect)
* p < 0.10 (against two-tailed test of zero effect)
While the results using the more natural CBP boundary are consistent with our previous results
and suggest that the assault effects are tightly concentrated around the stadium, our analysis is not
exactly an apples-to-apples one since the comparison geographic units are significantly larger than our
custom CBP unit. To address this, and to add a potentially more appropriate set of comparators, we
defined comparable boundaries around 10 popular sports bars throughout Philadelphia. Table 10
presents the results from the sports bars comparisons with comparable geographic boundaries.
Table 10: Assault Effect in CBP Area Compared With Sports Bars
(Standard Errors Clustered at Bar Level)
Full Sample
Before Xfinity Live
Late Pitches * Home * CBP
-0.0010**
-0.0015***
Natural Boundary
(0.0003)
(0.0003)
Note: Each regression includes controls for “Late Pitches * CBP,” “Home * CBP,” “Total Pitches *
Home * CBP,” and “Total Pitches * CBP” terms, as well as date specific fixed effects and bar area
specific fixed effects. Data cover 2006-2015. Only regular season games are included in game data.
Game days that include a double header or games with rain delay time are excluded from the data.
Non game days are excluded for games played in the Eastern time zone, the time period covered is
the time of the first pitch to the end of the game plus one hour. For games played in different time
zones, the time period covered is the time of the first pitch converted to Eastern time through the
end of the game plus one hour. Xfinity Live opened in the South Philadelphia Sports Complex (which
includes Citizens Bank Park) parking lot in March 2012. The area around Citizens Bank Park goes West
to Broad Street, South to I-95, North to I-76, and East for 1 mile. Comparisons are similar distances in
each direction around the following sports bars: Cavanaugh’s (Center City); Cavanaugh’s (University
City); Chickie’s and Pete’s (Robbins Avenue); Chickie’s and Pete’s (Roosevelt Avenue); Garage
Fishtown; Leneghan’s Crusader Inn (Northeast); the Manayunk Tavern; McGillin’s Olde Ale House
(Center City); Pub Webb (North Philadelphia); and Standard Tap (Northern Liberties). Standard errors
clustered on bar area.
*** p < 0.01 (against two-tailed test of zero effect)
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** p < 0.05 (against two-tailed test of zero effect)
* p < 0.10 (against two-tailed test of zero effect)
We find comparable statistically significant negative effects 25 on assault even in this more tightly
constructed comparison of sports bars. Since sports bars do not halt the sale of alcohol after the
seventh inning, but are populated with sports fans, this comparison has the potential to account for any
game-specific dynamics that could be related to assaults and whether the game extends for a long time
after the seventh inning.
For one last alternate geographic unit definition, Table 11 shows the results when we aggregate
crime counts to the Census block level. While Census blocks have the advantage of being predetermined, and they are tighter areas than the previously examined PSAs, the CBP Census block is not
ideal since it includes a largely inaccessible area (the Eagles Nova Care Practice Complex), while severely
restricting the eastern boundary of the CBP area. 26 That notwithstanding, the results again show that
assaults decline around CBP as games go longer after the seventh inning. In addition to comparing CBP
with all other Census blocks, we also attempt to examine more appropriate comparators by looking at
Census blocks that might be frequented by drinkers. To construct these comparisons, we look at Census
blocks that have more than the mean number of total liquor licenses (8) associated with addresses in
the Census block and those Census blocks that have at least one restaurant-based liquor license. 27
Table 11: Assault Effect in CBP Census Block
(Standard Errors Clustered at PSA Level)
{Two-Sided 10% Critical Values from Placebo Regressions}
Full Sample
Before Xfinity Live
Late Pitches * Home * CBP Census Block
-0.0013***
-0.0011***
(v. all Census Blocks)
(0.0000)
(0.0000)
Though the small number of bars limits the usefulness of a permutation inference approach here, it is possibly
worth noting that the CBP effect is more negative than every placebo effect in the pre-2012 analysis. It is more
negative than all but the effect estimated for McGillin’s Olde Ale House when the entire time span is analyzed.
26
The Census block eastern boundary is essentially the eastern wall of CBP.
27
Many overall liquor licenses are assigned to social organizations that might not actually imply a high level of
drinking (e.g., church groups), whereas restaurant-based liquor licenses likely indicate a consistent amount of
drinking in the area.
25
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{-0.0006, 0.0005}
{-0.0007, 0.0007}
Late Pitches * Home * CBP Census Block
-0.0013***
-0.0012***
(v. Census Blocks with > 8 Total Liquor
(0.0001)
(0.0001)
Licenses)
{-0.0009, 0.0006}
{-0.0012, 0.0012}
Late Pitches * Home * CBP Census Block
-0.0013***
-0.0012***
(v. Census Blocks with > 0 Restaurant
(0.0000)
(0.0000)
Liquor Licenses)
{-0.0006, 0.0006}
{-0.0008, 0.0008}
Note: Each cell represents the coefficient from a different regression. Each regression includes
controls for “Late Pitches * CBP Census Block,” “Home * CBP Census Block,” “Total Pitches * Home *
CBP Census Block,” and “Total Pitches * CBP Census Block” terms, as well as date specific fixed effects
and census block specific fixed effects. Data cover 2006-2015. Only regular season games are
included in game data. Game days that include a double header or games with rain delay time are
excluded from the data. Non game days are excluded. For games played in the Eastern time zone, the
time period covered is the time of the first pitch to the end of the game plus one hour. For games
played in different time zones, the time period covered is the time of the first pitch converted to
Eastern time through the end of the game plus one hour. Xfinity Live opened in the South
Philadelphia Sports Complex (which includes Citizens Bank Park) parking lot in March 2012. Standard
errors clustered on Census Block.
*** p < 0.01 (against two-tailed test of zero effect)
** p < 0.05 (against two-tailed test of zero effect)
* p < 0.10 (against two-tailed test of zero effect)
When examining the Census blocks, we again find that game time after the seventh inning is
associated with a statistically significant reduction in assaults. The implied proportionate reduction in
assaults is even larger than that implied in our previous analyses. This is true on average (an 89%
reduction) and when we focus on Census blocks with a relatively high number of liquor licenses
associated with them (an 87% reduction when compared to blocks with more than 8 total liquor licenses
and a 91% reduction when compared to blocks with at least 1 restaurant liquor license).

Conclusions
This paper set out to examine the relationship between alcohol consumption and crime around
a sports stadium. The seventh inning last call on alcohol sales provides a natural experiment to examine
alcohol consumption and crime around a sports stadium. The un-timed nature of baseball games means
that at some home games fans will have hours to sober up from drinking, whereas in others they may
have only minutes from the last drink to they depart from the stadium. Philadelphia offered an
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additional natural experiment in that the Xfinity Live! complex opened in 2012 effectively undoing the
limit on alcohol sales near the stadium. Our analysis included multiple comparisons of crime around the
CBP stadium, all showing that assault offenses generally drop on home game days that extend into
extra-innings. The effects are most pronounced at time windows closest to the end of the game, and the
effect appears to be undone by the arrival of Xfinity Live! that allows fans to continue to purchase and
drink alcohol on the stadium grounds. Like other crime and place studies (Kurland & Johnson, 2019), we
examine crime at multiple geographic levels, which allows us to see how robust the results are to
different levels of aggregation.
Considering that assaults are considerably higher on game days near the CPB stadium when
alcohol consumption and the end of the game are closer in time, this suggests that alcohol is a generator
of assaults around the stadium that result in calls to the police. This effect is clear given that we see no
similar reduction in crime around sports bars or other areas of Philadelphia when games go relatively
long after the seventh inning. This work extends other research in suggesting that sports stadiums are
crime generators (Billings & Depken, 2011; Kurland, 2014; Marie, 2016; Kurkland & Johnson, 2019;
Vandeviver et al., 2019; Campaniello, 2013; Munyo & Rossi, 2013), an effect that is likely enhanced by
alcohol consumption. Stadiums with alcohol may then be considered one of many episodic crime
generators in a city, much like bars that serve multiple drinks to patrons just before closing and let
crowds hang around outside after closing (Graham et al. 2006; Graham & Homel, 2012). These results
lend further support for environmental criminology theories that emphasize situational opportunities
that increase the risk for criminal offenses (Wilcox & Cullen, 2019). Like the work by others that find
sports stadiums are facilitators of crime nearby (Kurland & Johnson, 2019), this work suggests that
serving alcohol during MLB games closer the end of the game generates crime at stadiums around home
games.
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This study suggests policy implications for the curtailing violence associated with drinking
alcohol at baseball games. Considering the influence that serving alcohol closer to the end of the game
has for amplifying assaults on home game days, with no evidence of similar effects elsewhere in
Philadelphia, this implies a few potential avenues for policy. One implication is that more effort may be
needed to minimize loitering of drunk people outside of the stadium at the end of the game.
Additionally, the presence of police in specific locations outside the stadium that are more often the
presence of assaults may be warranted. Reducing queuing outside bars with rowdy patrons has been
noted as an effective approach to reducing assaults (Graham & Homel, 2012). And hot spot policing
experiments shows that placing police temporarily in high crime locations helps thwart crime (Weisburd
et al., 2012). Whether such approaches would be effective for reducing assaults around MLB stadiums
warrants controlled field experiments, as both approaches may prove to be less costly than curtailing
alcohol sales in stadiums.
The estimates from this study suggest that the last call for alcohol sales at the end of the
seventh inning leads to a reduction of 0.25 assaults per game on average. McCollister, French, and Fang
(2010) estimate that the social cost of an assault ranges between $24,000 and $107,000. This implies a
benefit per home game between $6,000 and $26,750 of ending alcohol sales in the seventh inning. 28 For
the cost of the policy, we need some estimate of the welfare loss of not being able to drink from the
seventh inning through the end of the game. Erickson et al (2011) suggests that about half of attendees
at professional football and baseball games report drinking at the game with little difference between
the two sports in terms of likelihood of drinking or the volume drank. While data on alcohol sales at
baseball games are scarce, one source suggests that the Indianapolis Colts sold $4 million in beer alone

This number might need to be inflated to account for benefits of the policy beyond reduced assaults. Although
our analyses suggest effects on other crimes might be limited, we did not examine DUI effects given that our highly
localized place-based identification strategy is not credible in the DUI context. Carpenter and Dobkin’s (2011)
review indicates that a number of studies find beneficial effects of alcohol restrictions on the incidence of DUIs.
28
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in its 11 home games in 2013, yielding a per game average of $364,000. The Colts attendance in 2013
was twice as large as Phillies attendance over the course of our sample. A back of the envelope estimate
of sales per Phillies game could then be $180,000 per game, over 7 innings. This yields a per inning sales
figure of $26,000. Adding two more innings of beer sales would suggest revenue gains of $52,000. For a
welfare estimate, this number would need to be adjusted both for costs (cost of the beer itself, labor
costs, etc.) and for consumer surplus (i.e., value derived from drinking the beer above the $6 average
price at CBP). Taking a standard rule of thumb regarding profit margins on draft beer in the restaurant
industry that suggests aiming for an 80 percent margin, even if consumers get zero surplus, the cost of
the lost beer sales alone ($41,600) exceed the value of the assaults averted (< $27,000).
Reducing assaults is important, but it also depends on how much social value society sees from
drinking at baseball games. These estimates also imply that efforts at managing crowds and where
drunk people congregate at the end of games may be more cost-effective than curtailing alcohol sales in
earlier innings.
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